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Recent Decisions
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964--EDUCATIONAL AND TEST-
ING REQUIREMENTS INVALID UNLESS JOB-RELATED--The United States
Supreme Court has held that an employer's use of educational and test-
ing requirements for screening job applicants violates Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the effect is to disqualify a dispropor-
tionate number of Negroes, and where there is no showing that either
standard is significantly related to job performance.
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Prior to the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1
a North Carolina employer openly discriminated on the basis of race
in the hiring and transferring of his employees. Negroes were restricted
to the lowest paying jobs in the labor department, while whites were
permitted to be hired or transferred into the operating departments
where the pay was substantially higher. After the Act became effective,
the employer abandoned his policy of restricting Negroes to the labor
department. This policy was replaced by the requirement that an em-
ployee must either have a high school education or attain a satisfactory
score on a standardized general intelligence test, as a condition of em-
ployment in-or transfer to-jobs in the operating departments from
which Negroes had formerly been excluded. Although the educational
and testing requirements were administered in a non-discriminatory
manner, the new standards disqualified a disproportionate number of
Negroes as compared with their white contemporaries. An action was
brought under Title VII by a group of Negro employees who were
hired after the educational and testing requirements were established
by the employer, but who failed to meet either standard for promotion
into the operating departments of the plant.2
The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against an employee because of his "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin" by classifying him in a way which would de-
prive him of "employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee." 3 An employer who requires fixed educational
1. §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
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and testing standards as conditions of employment and promotion
"classifies" his employees within the meaning of Title VII. Since Ne-
groes as a class suffer from inherently inferior social and cultural back-
grounds,4 such employment requirements, although administered fairly,
may operate to disqualify a disproportionate number of their race from
equal employment opportunities. 5 Title VII expressly prohibits an em-
ployer from acting upon the results of tests that are intended to dis-
criminate against any individual protected by the Act;6 therefore, in
Griggs, the district court was confronted with whether a "professionally
developed" employment test that operates with discriminatory effect
was intended to be an unlawful classification of employees .7 Conclud-
ing that the employer had adopted his testing requirements in good
faith, and without a racial purpose," the court dismissed the complaint
of the Negro employees. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 9 affirm-
ing the decision, also adopted a subjective test'0 to determine discrim-
inatory intent. Finding no evidence that the employer's purpose for
adopting the testing requirements was to discriminate against Negroes,
the court held that the employer's reliance on the results of profession-
ally developed tests was not violative of the Act."
Reversing the court of appeals, the United States Supreme Court
12
adopted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's objective
interpretation 13 of the Act, and concluded that the statutory standard
of intent is determined from the effect of the employment practice, and
4. 401 U.S. at 430, citing Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S.
285 (1969).
5. See Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A Gen-
eral Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598,
1640-41 (1969).
6. § 703(h) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C. 1968).
8. Id. at 250-51.
9. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
10. Id. at 1232.
11. Id. at 1235.
12. 401 U.S. at 433-34.
13. Id. at 433. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to as
EEOC] Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued August 24, 1966, provide:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test" to mean
a. test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the particular job
or class of jobs which the applicant seeks or which fairly affords the employer a
chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs.
The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or organization claiming exper-
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not from a subjective analysis of the employer's motives.1 4 Balancing
the respective interests of the employer and the employees affected by
the testing requirements, the Court found that the tests were not job-
related, and concluded that the employer did not have a valid business
need for the adoption of these requirements as a condition of employ-
ment.15 In short, the Court held that notwithstanding an employer's
lack of discriminatory intent, where the effect of an employment prac-
tice is to exclude a disproportionate number of a group protected by
the Act from equal employment opportunities, such a practice is un-
lawful unless the employer can establish a bona fide business justifica-
tion outweighing the discriminatory effects of the practice. Applying
this principle to educational and testing requirements, the Court de-
cided that such criteria must bear a demonstrable relationship to the
successful performance of the jobs for which they are used in order to
be valid under the Act. In other words, the test "must measure the
person for the job and not the person in the abstract. ' ' 16
Griggs resolves the apparent conflict in the lower court decisions as
to the intent requirements of the Act."' Since the enactment of Title
VII the courts have been split as to whether an objective standard18 or
a subjective standard 19 should apply in determining whether an em-
ployer has the statutory requisite of discriminatory intent. The objec-
tive standard adopted by the Griggs Court is consistent with the
majority viewpoint.20
The Griggs holding is compatible with the Act's objective to elim-
tise in test preparation does not, without more, justify its use within the meaning
of Title VII. Reprinted in BNA FAIR EMP. PRAc. 401:1501 (1966).
The EEOC position has been codified in the new Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1971).
14. 401 U.S. at 432.
15. Id. at 431-32.
16. Id. at 436.
17. See note 6, supra.
18. Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). In Local 189, the court objectively interpreted the
term "intent" as found in § 703(h) of the Act stating that: "[T]he statute, read literally
requires only that the defendant meant to do what he did, that is, his employment prac-
tice was not accidental." 416 F.2d at 996.
19. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 2 FEP Cases 40 (E.D. Ark. 1969). In
Parham an employer refused to hire an unwed mother. The court adopted a subjective
standard of intent and explained: "If [an employer] adopts his criteria in good faith and
for what reasonably appears to him to be valid reasons, and if the criteria are not them-
selves based on race, the court does not think they are prohibited by the Act merely
because many Negroes on account of cultural and economic deprivations may not be able
to meet them." Id. at 49.
20. Note, Arrest Records and Employment Discrimination: Gregory v. Litton Indus-
tries, Inc., 32 U. Pirr. L. REv. 254, 256 (1971).
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inate racial discrimination in employment, 21 and is not repugnant to
the interpretation given the Act by the majority of courts and legal
writers who have considered it in light of its legislative history and
social objectives. 22 It is also analogous in principle to the "Voting
Rights Cases ' 23 decided by the United States Supreme Court in the
1960's. In Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States,24 the Court
interpreted the Voting Rights Act of 196525 as prohibiting a county
government from using a literacy test to determine voter eligibility be-
cause the test had the effect of denying a disproportionate number of
Negroes the right to vote. In Gaston County, as in Griggs, the Court
rejected the contention that a test, fairly administered and adopted
without racial intent, would satisfy the requirements of the appropriate
statute.26 Griggs, therefore, represents a logical extension of the devel-
oping civil rights law into the private employment sector.
The principles established in Griggs will be expanded to other cri-
teria that employers use to screen applicants for hire and employees
for promotion.27 Griggs invalidates any employment standard that can-
not be shown to be job related, and which disqualifies a disproportion-
ate number of Negroes and others protected by the Act regardless of
whether the practice is fair on its face and is administered in a non-
discriminatory manner. Since most employers use some sort of screen-
ing device for both employment and promotion, the Court's broad
decision will have a significant impact on employment practices. 28
The prospective application of Griggs is obvious, and employers
should have no difficulty in evaluating their screening and selection
techniques. 29 The more difficult question raised by the Griggs decision
21. Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). See Comment, Employment Test-
ing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 268, 274
(1971).
22. See Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); Kovarsky,
Testing and the Civil Rights Act, 15 How. L. J. 227 (1969); Cooper and Sobol, supra note
5.
23. Gaston County, North Carolina v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
24. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
25. §§ 2-19, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (Supp. V, 1969).
26. 395 U.S. at 296-97.
27. See Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1971). In par-
ticular see EEOC definition of "test," Id. § 1607.2, and material relevant to other selection
techniques, Id. § 1607.13.
28. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer policy against
hiring women with pre-school age children); Gregory C. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp.
401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (employer policy against hiring applicants with arrest records); EEOC
Decision No. 71-1418, 3 FEP Cases 580 (March 17, 1971) (employer policy of rigid adherence
to height requirements); EEOC Decision No. 71-322, 2 FEP Cases 1016 (September 29,
1970) (employer policy against hiring unwed mothers).
29. Griggs may create serious problems, however, for employers who rely on tests and
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is whether it has opened the door to a retroactive application of Title
VII.
Much of the Title VII litigation has been concerned with inter-
pretation of the seniority and test clauses of section 703(h) of the Act.30
In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Incorporated,31 a district court found that
prior to 1965, an employer. openly discriminated in the hiring and
placement of Negro employees so that after 1965, although the em-
ployer had ceased its discriminatory practices, these Negroes were
"locked into" the lowest paying jobs by virtue of the employer's senior-
ity system.32 There the court held that the seniority clause of section
703(h) of the. Act did not prohibit the court from modifying an exist-
ing seniority system not in itself violative of the Act, but found to be
discriminatory because it perpetuated the effect of an employer's prior
overt acts. 3 Although expressly denying that its decision involved a
retroactive application of the Act, the district court corrected discrim-
inatory conditions that existed prior to the passage of the Act, and rea-
soned that its remedial measures only affected the present consequences
of these conditions and were, therefore, not retroactive.3 4
More recent Title VII litigation 35 has been concerned with the test
clause of section 703(h) and, like Quarles, has involved employment
practices neutral on their face but discriminatory in effect. In these
cases the principle now approved by the Griggs decision was first es-
tablished; that is, when an employment practice, because of social and
cultural conditions existing in society has the effect of discriminating
against a group protected by the Act, it is invalid regardless of an em-
ployer's lack of discriminatory intent. Whereas the cases of the first
type (Quarles) involved litigants who were subject to prior acts of dis-
crimination, the cases of the latter type (Griggs) involve a class of plain-
tiffs not subject to pre-Act discrimination, but who are presently
discriminated against because of the effects of an apparently neutral
employment practice. To further distinguish between the two types of
other objective criteria for selecting qualified persons for both hire and promotion. For
a thorough discussion of some of these problems see Cooper and Sobol, supra note 5, at
1676-79.
30. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). Employment practices based on a "bona
fide seniority system" or a "professionally developed ability test" are the two major ex-
ceptions to the broad prohibitions of § 703(a)(2).
31. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
32. Id. at 513-14.
33. Id. at 520-21.
34. Id. at 518-19.
35. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970); Broussard v.
Schlumberger Well Services, 315 F.. Supp. 506- (SJ).. Tex. 1970).
274
Vol; 10: 270, 197.1
Recent Decisions
cases, in Griggs, the Court held that the Act was directed at the con-
sequences of all employment practices regardless of intent and not
simply those practices, as in Quarles, which perpetuate the effects of
an employer's prior acts based on discriminatory motives.
Griggs, dealing only with the discriminating effect of present em-
ployment practices, would not appear to create any problem of retro-
activity. When Griggs however, is considered in light of Quarles, an
interesting question of retroactivity is raised, that is, whether an em-
ployer who had administered employment tests3 6 prior to the effective
date of Title VII, which were not then but are now illegal under the
Act, can be required to modify a presently neutral seniority system on
the basis that it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.
An affirmative answer to that question would require an extension
of the Quarles principle to a situation where the pre-Act discrimina-
tion was not the result of an intent to discriminate. If Griggs is inter-
preted so-that the objective standard of intent is applied to pre-Act as
well as present conduct then there would appear to be no reason why
Quarles should not be extended to include those situations. Such an
interpretation would, of course, subject the Act to a charge of retroac-
tivity. If, on the other hand, the Griggs standard is interpreted to apply
only to present conduct, then the Quarles principle would not be so
extended and no problem of retroactivity would be raised. To place
the problem in its proper perspective, consider the example of a class
of Negroes37 who were refused jobs or promotions prior to 1964 be-
cause of their failure to pass an aptitude test which was not job-related.
If the Griggs standard were extended by Quarles to include pre-Act
conduct, it would appear that those Negroes who were in the job mar-
ket and were not hired, as well as those who had jobs and were not
promoted, would have a cause of action for an advanced position on a
seniority list.3 Negroes in this class would find support in Quarles that
the failure to grant them an advanced position would result in the
perpetuation of the effects of the employer's previously discriminatory
36. Employment tests are used here only for explanatory purposes. The same rationale
would apply to any employment practice now invalidated by Griggs. See notes 27 and 28
supra, and textual material related thereto.
37. Negro is used here for explanatory purposes only. The same rationale would apply
to any-person or groups of persons protected by the Act.
38. A new employee put on the bottom of a seniority list would suffer from the same
infirmities that resulted in the modification of the seniority system in Quarles. Had the
discriminatory test not been ,used the employee would have been hired or promoted
earlier, and would.hold a position on the seniority list commensurate with the earlier date.
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testing practice.39 Although there has been no litigation on this precise
issue the rationale of a recent EEOC decision indicates that the Com-
mission would favor this position.40
The argument for an advanced position on a seniority list as a rem-
edy for past discrimination might well be advanced in one of several
ways. Relying on Quarles, Negroes could argue that the requested rem-
edy was not retroactive in that the object of the remedy is to eliminate
the present consequences of the discrimination and not the discrimina-
tion itself.41 Alternatively, even if the remedy was construed as a retro-
active application of the Act, the argument could be made that the
remedy is a valid exercise of government power to further the designs
of the Act to eliminate racial discrimination in employment; 42 and fur-
ther, that the remedy-even though retroactive-does not impair the
vested seniority rights of incumbent white employees, since promotions
based on seniority are a mere expectation and not a vested right.43 Since
statutes that impair vested rights are subject to a constitutional chal-
lenge,44 a successful argument for the latter position may be necessary
to save this retroactive application of the Act from being declared un-
constitutional.
There are persuasive arguments against the granting of an advanced
seniority position to an employee who, on the basis of the Griggs stan-
dard, was the subject of pre-Act discrimination. First, a construction of
Title VII which would permit the modification of a seniority system
to the extent required here would subject it to a charge of retroactivity.
39. 279 F. Supp. at 520-21.
40. EEOC Decision No. 71-1447, 3 FEP Cases 391 (March 18, 1971). The EEOC found
that an employer's seniority system discriminated against employees hired after 1964, but
whose employment was postponed due to the employer's prior discriminatory practices.
In other words, the EEOC found that if an employer had not discriminated prior to 1964,
certain Negroes who were in the job market at the time would have been hired sooner
and would have thus earned greater seniority rights than what they presently possessed.
Although this case only involved those Negroes who were hired after the employer
eliminated his discriminatory hiring practices, the same rationale could be applied to
those Negroes who were not subsequently hired but who were in the job market at the
time the employer was discriminating. For a thorough discussion on the practical problems
of identifying persons who would be included in a group of the latter type, see Cooper
and Sobol, supra note 5, at 1632-36.
41. 279 F. Supp. at 520-21.
42. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Speert v. Morgenthau, 116 F.2d 301,
305 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
43. Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 5-7 (1967); Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature
and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1540-42, 1553 (1962).
44. Lundquist v. Coddington Bros., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 19, 21 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Stancil
v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Va. 1961); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 692-97 (1960).
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Statutes are presumed to apply prospectively 45 unless there is an express
provision for retroactivity in the statute itself, or an otherwise clear ex-
pression of legislative intent46 to the contrary. Legislative intent may
be inferred from the legislative history of the statute.47 There is noth-
ing in Title VII itself to suggest that it was intended to be retroactively
applied, and its legislative history clearly expresses the intent of Con-
gress that existing seniority systems would not be affected by its enact-
ment.48 The Quarles Court reasoned that its remedy modifying an
existing seniority system was not contrary to the legislative history of
the Act since the history dealt only with employment seniority and not
job seniority. 49 The difference between the remedy ordered by Quarles,
and that which is required to improve the relative seniority positions
of employees who were not hired or promoted as a result of past un-
intended but discriminatory employment practices, is fairly obvious. In
the first instance a simple modification of a seniority system so that all
future promotions would be based on employment seniority rather than
job seniority is all that is required. 50 In the second, a fictional credit51
45. Hassett v. Welch, 303 US. 303, 314 (1938); Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 592 (1922).
46. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Casados, 305 U.S. 558 (1938) aff'g 21 F. Supp. 989, 1000
(D.C. N.M. 1938); United States v. St. Louis, San Fran. & Tex. Ry., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1925);
Silurian Oil Co. v. Essley, 54 F.2d 43, 47 (10th Cir. 1931).
47. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Casados, 305 U.S. 558 (1938) aff'g 21 F. Supp. 989, 1000
(D.C. N.M. 1938); DuLaney, Insurance Comm'r. v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 47 S.W.2d
1082, 1083 (Ark. 1932); Gallegos v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 214 P. 579, 582 (N.M. 1923).
48. During the Congressional debates Senator Clark presented an interpretive memo-
randum from the Department of Justice which explains:
First it has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested rights of seniority.
This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the
time it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in
the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision
would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in the case
where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white workers
had more seniority than Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker
is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under established seniority rules
he is "low man on the totem pole," he is not being discriminated against because of
his race. Of course, if the seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful
under Title VII. If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before any
white man, such a rule could not serve as the basis for a discharge subsequent to the
effective date of the title .... But, in the ordinary case, assuming that seniority rights
were built up over a period of time during which Negroes were not hired, these rights
would not be set aside by the taking effect of Title VII. Employers and labor organi-
zations would simply be under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes because of
their race. Any differences in treatment based on established seniority rights would
not be forbidden by the title.
Department of Justice Interpretive Memorandum on H.R. 7152, 110 CONG. REC. 6986
(daily ed. April 8, 1964). See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1266 (1967); note 52, infra.
49. 279 F. Supp. at 516.
50. Id. This is the remedy imposed by the Quarles Court.
51. This is a modification of the "Freedom Now" and "Rightful Place" theories dis-
cussed in Note, supra note 48, at 1268-75, and expressly rejected in Local 189, United Paper-
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must be granted to an employee to represent those seniority credits he
would have earned had his employment not been postponed due to
the employer's discriminatory practices. In the former, the court is
utilizing a right already possessed by the employee (employment senior-
ity) and in the latter, in order to remedy the imbalance, the court must
grant the employee a benefit he has not earned (fictional seniority). Not
only is a remedial measure based on fictional seniority clearly contrary
to the legislative history of the Act,5 2 but it is doubtful that the court
could apply the rationale of the first situation to that of the second and
still logically conclude that its application was not retroactive. Conse-
quently, in order to apply Griggs and Quarles as has been suggested
here, the court must be willing to ignore the legislative history of the
Act and assume that Title VII can be retroactively applied.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the retroactive application of
Title VII is found in section 703(j) 53 of the Act which specifically bars
reverse discrimination. It would appear that this section would pro-
hibit the granting of fictional seniority credits to correct imbalances
that existed prior to the Act. It has been argued, however, that the leg-
islative history of this section deals only with a prohibition against the
replacement of senior white workers by junior Negro incumbents, and
that a system of redistribution of jobs based on fictional seniority would
makers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The EEOC denied that its position in Decision No. 71-1447
(see note 40, supra) would lead to fictional seniority but failed to suggest an alternative
remedy. 3 FEP Cases at 394, n.ll.
52. Interpretive Memorandum of H.R. 7152 submitted jointly by Senator Joseph S.
Clark and Senator Clifford P. Case, Floor Managers, 110 CONG. REcoRD 6991, 6992 (daily
ed. April 8, 1964):
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondis-
criminatory basis. He would not be obliged--or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in
order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are
hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired
earlier. (However, where waiting lists for employment or training are, prior to the
effective date of the title, maintained on a discriminatory basis, the use of such lists
after the title takes effect may be held an unlawful subterfuge to accomplish dis-
crimination).
See note 48, supra.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964) provides:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race,
color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total' number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin employed by any employer
... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area.
See Note, Civil Rights-Racially Discriminatory Employment Practices Under Title VII,
46 N.C.L. REv. 891; 895 (1968)..
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not violate the intent of the Act.5 4 A court dedicated to eliminating the
social injustices that Title VII was designed to correct could easily
adopt this construction of the Act.
Finally, both Griggs and Quarles were decided on their own facts,
and there is nothing in either decision to suggest that the present con-
sequences of unintentional pre-Act conduct would come within the
purview of the Act. Griggs does not stand for the proposition that an
objective standard of intent should be applied to a period of time dur-
ing which the statute was not in effect. If the Court had intended that
this standard was to be retroactive it would have made express provi-
sion for that circumstance in its opinion.
The Court's adoption of an objective standard of intent in Griggs
would appear to be a valid measure for meaningfully enforcing the de-
signs of the Act to eliminate discrimination in employment. To extend
the objective standard to pre-Act conduct, however, would undoubtedly
be a retroactive application of the Act which, if not expressly prohibited
by the Act itself, certainly raises a question as to the constitutionality of
such a judicial construction. It would appear that the fourteenth
amendment would prohibit the granting of preferential treatment by
means of fictional seniority to any person or group of persons so as to
divest incumbent workers of their reasonable expectancies for promo-
tion and advancement.5 5 The effect of such preferential treatment
would be the application of a statutory standard of intent to a period
of time not intended to be covered by the Act, and to create undue
hardships on those employers whose discriminatory employment prac-
tices were not foreseeable nor racially motivated. The complex matter
of rectifying past social injustices is not a function of the judiciary. If
the Griggs standard is to be retroactively applied to remedy conditions
which existed prior to the passage of the Act, that task is more appro-
priately left to the legislature.
Fred W. Veil
54. Cooper and Sobol, supra note 5, at 1635; Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1260, 1271 (1967).
55. Carter v. Gallagher, No. 71-1181 (8th Cir., Sept. 9, 1971).
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